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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM P. STEPHENS and his wife,
ISABELLE L. STEPHENS, and J. B.
MARSH,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
11106

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action brought by Ogden City, a municipal
corporation, to obtain through eminent domain proceedings a
parcel of property for a public off street parking lot.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court held that Ogden City had the lawful
power and authority to take the property for a public off
street parking lot to be used in conjunction with properties
the city had acquired to the East and West of the subject
property.
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A jury trial was held September 28, 29 and October 2
196 7, whereupon a verdict was returned for the defendants'
William P. Stephens, Isabelle L. Stephens and J. B. Marsh
and judgment was entered accordingily.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the Court determine that it
does not have jurisdiction to hear this aweal or, if necessary,
seeks to have this court affirm the trial court's decision that
Ogden City had the lawful power and authority to acquire
the property through eminent domain proceedings and to affirm the verdict which was returned.
FACTS
The facts as set forth in the appellants' brief which
relate to the parking lot, the improvements thereon, and the
historical background of this lawsuit are essentially correct.
To present a more realistic picture in appellants' fourth
paragraph of the facts, it should be pointed out that the so
called "rental units" on the Stephens' property had been condemned by the city as health and fire hazards several years
before the razing, (Tr. 87, 114), and had also been uninhabited during that period. (Tr. 95, 122). In the last paragraph
it was the defendants who moved for the new trial, (R. 41),
while the plaintiff moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict in reference to the severance damages and leasehold amounts, ( R. 45), although the record does reflect that
the Court granted plaintiff's motion for new trial on both
phases of the lawsuit, land and lease. (R. 44).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED OVER
ONE MONTH FROM THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND, THEREFORE, THIS COURT
LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THIS
APPEAL.
The trial concluded and the jury reached its verdict on
September 2, 1967. Judgment on the verdict in open court
was filed and docketed on October 4, 1967, by the Weber
County Clerk in favor of the Stephens, (R. 68), and in favor
of J. B. Marsh. (R. 69).
The Judgment on Verdict and Final Order of Condemnation were signed by Judge John F. Wahlquist on October 11,
1967, and docketed respectively as entry number 15776,
(R. 67), and 17775, (R. 66), on October 13, 1967, which
started the time running in which to appeal. These documents
were sent to the defendants' attorney, (R. 71), and the
amount as provided by the Final Order of Condemnation was
paid to the Clerk of the Court.
U tab Rules of Civil Procedure., in Rule 73 (a), specifies
how and when an aµpeal is to be taken as follows:
"When an appeal is permitted from a District Court to
the Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal may
be taken shall be one month from the entry of judgment
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by
law, ... "
The only exception provided is excusable neglect of a
party to learn of the entry of judgment.
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The defendants' attorney, upon receipt of the Judgment
and Final Order of Condemnation on October 10, 1967, requested certain additions to the interest payments, payments
for use of parking stalls used by the city, and additional witness fees. The city's response indicating certain monetary
adjustments was forwarded to the defendants' attorney dated
October 1 7, 196 7. ( R. 75). The Notice of Appeal filed by
the defendants was dated December 5, 196 7, and filed December 6. 1967. (R. 74).
A recent Utah case, In Re Estate of Ratcliff, 19 Utah
2d 346, 431 P 2d 5 71, ( 196 7), involved an appeal wherein
the appellant had until April 1, 1966, to file the notice of
aweal. The notice was received by the District Court Clerk
on April 1, additional copies of the notice were received on
April 4, and the filing fee paid on April 8, 1966. The Court
there stated:
"Since the notice was filed more than one month after
the entry of judgment on the order appealed from (Rule
73 (a), U.R.C.P., this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and is therefore compelled to order a dismissal thereof."
It is submitted that defendants were well aware that
judgment had been entered, that they had received copies of
the judgment, that the Final Order of Condemnation reflected interest payments on the judgment of 8 % per annum from
October 2, 196 7, that the interest payments were made, that
defendant's attorney forwarded to the city questions relating
to the judgment and received a response thereto, and on this
basis defendants had knowledge of the entry of judgment,
that the neglect in filing the appeal was not excusable and
this court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction and should not enter4

tain this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE PROPERTY TAKEN WAS FOR A PUBLIC
PURPOSE AND 'WAS NECESSARY FOR AN INTEGRATED PARKING LOT FOR THE USE OF
THE PUBLIC.
The legislature has enacted legislation providing for the
use of eminent domain proceedings in a variety of public
necessity uses among which are parking lots as is set forth
in U.C.A., 10-8-8, as follows:
"They (referring to cities) may lay out, establish, open,
alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise
improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,
parks, airports, parking lots or other facilities for the
parking of vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts thereof by
ordinance.
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P 2d 343,
(1933), involved an eminent domain proceeding for the purpose of developing a public street from what had been a private lane. The court, as suggested by the appellants, felt
that based upon the legislative enactment it could inquire as
to whether the use of the property was one authorized by
law, that is, a public use, but in so doing determined that:
"The phrase 'public use', as used in the eminent domain
statute has been given a liberal interpretation by this
court."
The court further held:
"Under powers thus delegated to municipal boards the
5

necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening a public
street or ·way is a political question, and in the absence
of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion the action of
such board will not be disturbed by the courts."
In the situation at hand, there is no allegation• of fraud

bad faith or abuse of discretion. The Ogden City Council'
determined that an integrated public parking lot was needed
and passed a resolution to acquire the remaining parcel of
property through eminent domain proceedings. The resoluiton was passed pursuant to the legislation giving cities the
authority to establish facilities for the parking of vehicles
off streets.
Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 13, 233 SW 2d 26,
(1950), provides a good summary of the reasons why off
street parking has become considered a public use, and the
property required subject to eminent domain proceedings. The
court there pointed out, in part, as follows:
"The stipulation of facts shows that some 23 states have
passed enabling legislation authorizing municipalities to
acquire and operate off street parking facilities for a
fee. . . It is common knowledge that during the last 20
years, there has been a very great increase in the number
of motor vehicles. . . Traffic congestion has become an
acute problem in many of the cities and towns in this
state. . . . We take judicial notice of the fact that off
street parking tends to facilitate traffic and avoids
hazards to life and property."
"The matter of the control of such motor vehicles when
entering or leaving public highways, their movement on
the highways, the parking of such vehicles on the highway or on public areas provided off the highway and the
regulation and control of motor vehicle traffic .generally

6

is referable to the police power, as being directly connected with public safety and welfare. This police power
may be delegated by the state."
"We hold that the purposes proposed to be carried into
effect by the ordinance in question are public purposes.
Similar views have been expressed by the courts of other
states." (Giving numerous citations).
"The acquisition of land for and the establishment and
operation of public off street parking stations or garages
by the defendant city being for a public use and for public purposes, the fact that such stations will compete with
private enterpises is not material or decisive."
Although not as inclusive, a similar result was reached
by the court in City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664, 151
P 2d 5, (1944), wherein the following statements were made:
"Respondent contends that public parking places are
not public improvements. The Legislature, however, has
expressly authorized the acquisition of parking places to
serve the public, and the legislation is valid so long as it
serves some public purpose. (Giving several citations}.
Just as public streets can be used for the parking of
motor vehicles, property can be acquired for the same
use. Moreover, public parking places relieve congestion
and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a public
purpose."
With the increase in the number of automobiles and their
use, it is necessary to make the required provisions to handle
the parking of them particularly in our expanding metropolitan areas. The Utah legislature wisely determined that off
street parking was necessary and was a public use and the
Ogden City Council saw fit to implement that use for the
public citizens of Ogden City.
7

The Stephens' property was required for an integrated
off street parking lot as set forth in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact, and paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law,
( R. 70), as follows:
6. "The said ,properties which have been purchased by
Ogden City have a frontage on Grant Avenue, on Lincoln
Avenue, and on a public alley extending along the south
border of said properties which also borders the south
boundary of the Stephens properties herein, however, the
alley is of such a nature, particularly as to width, that
it would be impossible for the defendants in the operation of an integrated parking lot to control the ingress
and egress of the portion west of the Stephens' property
without tthe acquisition of the said property."
2. "That said action is legal as consistent with the
greatest iPUblic good and least private harm."
ARGUMENT
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
THE OPINION TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESSES.
This point and its ramifications opens the field to question the basis of any statement made by any expert during
the trial.
In approaching a general comparison of appraisers, one
of the requisites is a general knowledge of real estate values
within the particular area involved. Disregarding the prop·
erty owner, Mr. Stephens, who gave no valid basis for his
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appraisal, it is interesting to note from the transcript, how
knowledgable each expert was in regard to the particular
area.
"Q. (To Raymond Fletcher). (Tr. 215). Would you
say that the value of real estate in the 25th Street
area has increased since 1946, the last 21 years?
A. I would say yes, but I really have nothing to base
that on. All sales on 25th Street in 1946 as against
196 7, I couldn't give you any proof of it. My reaction
is yes, I think they have increased.
Q. And this reaction, you would give me, would be
based on real estate values generally, and not particularly 25th Street, is that correct?

A.

Yes, that is correct.

"Q. (To Harley McDowell). (Tr. 230). Prior to
the appraisal you made on this particular property
have you made any appraisals in commercial downtown
Ogden, in the six years preceding that time?
A.

I had not.

Q.

You were in Ogden at that time?

A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

In 1946?

A.

Yes.

Q.

OKay.

A. I have been here various times since then but not
in an appraiser capacity in the city limits.
Q. Did you make appraisals on 25th Street when you
were here in 1946?
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A.

Sir, I can't remember.

"Q. (To Lawrence Taylor). (Tr. 252). And, how
long have you been making appraisals in this particular
area?
A.

About 34 years.

Q. (Tr. 266-B). What is the history of land value
in the 25th Street area, what has it been over the last
20 years?
A. They have been depreciating in value every year,
possibly the last few years they have gotten so low
they can't go down much more.

Q. And, in reference to the Federal Building, would
you say that dramatically changed real estate value on
the Grant Avenue side opposite from it?
A.

No, it did not."

The plaintiff's second witness had been making appraisals in Ogden for some 14 or 15 years. (Tr. 312).
The income approach to determine value was not used by
the plaintiff's experts since they felt that the parking lot was
not developed sufficiently to give a sufficient basis on which
to predicate an income analysis. In addition, they felt that
the locations of the parking lots in the retail district, that
were partially being subsidized by the merchants, could not
logically be used for income comparisons. (Tr. 262, 266-B,
309).
The defendants' experts used the income approach, Mr.
Fletcher giving the most weight to this approach. (Tr. 189).
However, to arrive at his conclusion he used income figures
10

supplied by Mr. Stephens. (Tr. 200, 201). These figures
were identical to those supplied by Mr. Stephens in his answer number 10, in the Anwers to Interrogatories. (R. 21).
His income tax returns, ( Def's. Exh. 23), reflected quite
another figure. By mathematical computation, using the difference in the two, Mr. Fletcher's income analysis, based on
the income tax return figures, would have resulted in an appraisal price of $24,080.67.
These figures, however, were not the only basis used by
Mr. Fletcher. He compared other parking lots near the retail
business district of Ogden, not only for income analysis but
for his market approach or comparable sales.
"Q. (To Mr. Fletcher). (Tr. 197). I think you stated
that the main basis of this appraisal was based upon
the income approach. Is that correct?
A.

That is right.

Q. To substantiate your income figures, do you know,
I presume you had some basis is that right?
A.

I do.

Q. And, where did
figures?

you obtain those particular

A. The projected rental income was based on rental
received at six lots in the nearby vicinity.
Q.

And where was the closest lot?,

A. As I recall, the closest one was the Lancaster ramp
on Kiesel, however, it is a little different type facility
being a ramp, partially covered, as opposed to our
open lot.
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Q. And, would you in comparing parking lots, what
would you say were the factors that were most crucial
in determining the value or the rate charged?
A. I think location is the most important item by far.
The physical facility, of course, enters into it, but the
location is your number one.
Q. And, did you determine the proportion of daily
rentals obtained as compared to monthly rentals obtained on those lots?
A.

No, I was not able to get that information.

Q. Other than the computations and figures based
upon these parking lots, did you use any other figures
to determine the income that might be obtained from
the Stephen's parking lot.
A. No, I based it on this market comparison of what
is currently or was currently charged for downtown
parking space.
Q. (Tr. 216). Hasn't all the four you testified to as
comparable, don't they have one entrance where they
are controlled where one goes in and one comes out?
A.

Well, most of the others.

Q.

Used as parking operation only?

A. Frankly all of them are controlled, yes, entrance
and exit. Very often one channel will be used for
either purpose."

Mr. Harley McDowell also put weight on the income
approach giving it equal value to the market analysis or comparable sales, (Tr. 224), but in so doing all comparisons were
with lots having an attendant, and with one exception bis
12

comparable sales were with parking lots not in close proximity.
"Q. (Tr. 239). And, did you determine in relationship to them, did you make any determination of
Stephens when they operated the same.
A.

No, they were not.

Q. Didn't they, in fact, have one exit and one entrance which was controlled.
A.

That is correct."

It should be further noted that Mr. McDowell's computations were based upon figures for monthly parking which
had not, nor ever have been charged.

"Q. (Tr. 246). Tell me what this potential is based
on, what rate?
A. That would be based on the rate that they were
charging on the lot at the time. I based it entirely on
his lease.
Q.

What was that?

A.

Eight dollars per month.

Q. Did you talk to Mr. Marsh? Did he ever tell you
eight dollars per month?
A. I believe that he did, that is the figure that I have
here. Just a minute, let me check my notes. That is
correct.
Q. Mr. McDowell, Mr. Marsh told you eight dollars
a month?

A.

So did Mr. Stephens.

13

Q.

So you used the basis of eight dollars per monthi

A.

I did.

Mr. Mash, the lessee, clarified the lease situation some.
what as follows:

"Q.

(Tr. 176). Were they ever full?

A.

No.

Q.

I am sorry.

A.

We didn't e~pect them to be.

Q.

What was the price you were charging per stall?

A.

In 48 lots, so to speak, originally?

Q.

Any time?

A.

Five dollars per stall monthly.

Q. Did you ever charge any more than five dollars
per stall?

A.

No, sir.

Q. Are you aware of the rate that is now being
charged on the lot?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How much is that?

A. Four dollars per month, with some daytime parking."

It should also be pointed out that Mr. Marsh entered
into the lease, but made no attempt to reflect income or loss
on his income tax, (Tr. 163), without retaining any receipt
books, (Tr. 163), without considering the parking operation
without an attendant, (Tr. 166), and feeling the Bell Park·
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ing Lot immediately to the west would not result in any competitive detriment. (Tr. 167).
Although the buildings on Grant Avenue as shown on
Defendant's exhibit 8 were torn down by the city, and the
lot extended to the street and to the west as reflected on
Defendant's Exhibit 6, the actual net income from the integrated parking lot operation, (Tr. 334, 335), did not a.pproach
that which the defendants' experts had projected for the
Stephens lot alone.
The market approach or comparable sales method of
determining the value of the property was used by all four
experts. It was generally agreed that proximity in time and
location are the key factors to be considered.
The Utah law as set forth in State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d
263, 265 P 2d 630, (1953), likewise set forth similar factors
as follows:
"Thus the price paid for similar lands, if the time of such
sale and location of the lands are sufficiently near and
the sale is made without compulsion is admissible in evidence on direct examination to show the value of lands
in question. However, even though they do not have to
be identical in size or shape or ,possible uses, but there
must be sufficient similarity in these respects and in
proximity in time of sale and the location of the properties to satisfy the trial judge that such evidence will be
helpful to the jury in determining the value of the property in question .... Also, evidence of the price paid for
similar property is admissible on cross examination of
witnesses who have submitted an opinion of the value
of the property in question."

In analyzing the comparable sales used by the experts,
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the proximity of location of the sales used by the plaintiff's
witnesses was considered by them as being of considerable
importance, since even a small distance in one direction or
another in a commercial downtown district can make a great
deal of difference in real estate values. (The location of all
comparables can be seen on plaintiff's exhibit E, the plaintiffs
with yellow checks, the defendants with orange blocks). They
felt that an excellent comparable was the Thompson property,
(Tr. 262), which sold for $1.08 a square foot on May 24,
1963, (Tr. 256, 316, 351), not 1959 as suggested on page 28
of appellants' brief. This property was located on the interior
of the block, had old buildings of no value located on it, had
no direct frontage on any street, and was accessible from
Electric Alley - all similar to the Stephens' property. It
was 91.6 feet directly to the west of the Stephens' property
with only the Bell property being in between. This was the
only comparable sale used by any witness which did not have
frontage on a street the full length or width, whichever the
case may be, of the property. It was pointed out that on
Grant Avenue if frontage property was of commercially useable d~pth, such frontage property would have three times the
value of an interior lot. (Tr. 268). The Thompson property
was listed for sale with the Froerer Corporation for any one
to purchase. (Tr. 259, 356 ). There is no evidence that Ogden
City was interested in establishing a parking lot at the time
the property was listed and certainly there was no threat of
condemnation.
Another comparable used by plaintiff's witnesses was the
Green-Cardon property directly north of Stephens' property
which had two good buildings on it and sold in 1963 for $1.7 5
or $1.80 per square foot. (Tr. 260, 316). (See defendants'
16

exhibits 17 and 18).
A third comparable was the Lamph, Anderson and Newey
property located directly to the south with frontage on both
Grant Avenue and 25th Street which sold in 1959 for $3.62
a square foot. (Tr. 255, 314). There were also several commercial establishments and a hotel located in the building on
the property. The fourth comparable used by both was the
Malan property which sold in 1961 for 54c per square foot.
(Tr. 261, 316). This comparable was not on the basis of
proximity of location, but upon being a similarly improved
parking lot, being a lot operated without an attendant on a
monthly parking rental basis, being a similar distance from
the downtown commercial district and being approximately
the same distance from a Federal Office building-the Malan
lot being located near the Forest Service Building. In addition, Mr. Taylor used the Tulatos property in the same block
as the Stephens' property and Mr. Sears used the Simone
property adjacent to and directly east of the Stephens' property.
In contrast to the plaintiff's expert witnesses the defendants' expert witnesses used only one comparable that was
located near the Stephens' property, that one being at 2456
Grant Avenue on the east side of Grant Avenue with frontage
and a commercial building located upon it. This sold in 1959
for $3.06 or $3.00 per square foot. (Tr. 186, 233).

In comparison of the time of
parables used by the witnesses for
timely, but again, the distance from
questions as to whether or not they
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the sales, the other comthe defendants were more
Stephens' property, leaves
were actually comparable.

In Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10
Utah 2d 29, 347 P 2d 862, (1959), the court dealt with the
question of remoteness in time. The land in question in that
case had been purchased by the condemnee 6V:! years prior
to the time of service of summons by the condemnor. The
court pointed out:
"The time is not so remote as to eliminate the probative
value of the price as some evidence to consider in placing
a fair value upon that land. The more remote the time
of the prior sale the less probative value it may have on
the immediate situation, but that goes to the weight of
the evidence and not its competency or its relevance."
The appellants, in their testimony and in their brief, have
expressed and pointed out that potentially the property values
would raise in the area, and the Federal Building would re·
suit in an extensive build up in the area. However, in
referring to the particular area in question, Mr. Fletcher
testified, "I don't remember seeing anything from the period
when I first saw the property in the summer of '65 until the
end of the summer of '66. I don't at the moment recall any
major changes there. (Tr. 215).
The only real improvement in the area was after S~tem·
ber, 1966, when the building to the south was remodeled with
the Utah State Tax Commission and an attorney's office oc·
cupying space there.
There is no evidence that from the inception of the idea
to build the Federal Building on its present location in 1963,
through the completion of the building in 1965 or the date of
taking, May 24, 1965 that land values in the area in question
had increased.
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The District Court Judge, upon objection from defendants' counsel, instructed the jury in reference to the date of
the plaintiff's appraisal as follows: "I will receive the testimony and the jury can judge whether it is sufficiently apt to
have value or not." (Tr. 266).
The jury was also instructed regarding the Thompson
sale: "I receive the evidence unless you can show a forced
sale relationship. The jury is instructed that if you believe
that the price was affected by the City's possibility of condemning the property in any way, then you should disregard
it."
In the final analysis, the jury determined that the plaintiff's witnesses were not correct in their total appraisal price
of $22,000.00. They apparently felt that the values in the
area had increased regardless of the testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses and rather than giving the landowner a 10 % per
year increase as suggested by the defendants' witnesses, they
gave in excess of a 33 % increase to $34,000.00.
In regard to the value to be placed on the opinion of
expert witnesses by the jury, the rule is suggested in 27 Am
Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, Section 425, pages 317 and 318:
"The opinions of experts as to value, however, are not
to be passively received and blindly followed, but are
to be weighed by the jury and judged in view of all the
testimony in the case and the jury's own general knowledge of affairs, and are to be given only such consideration as the jury may believe them entitled to receive. It
has been held that the condemnation verdict or award
cannot be higher than the highest estimate of the ex.pert
witnesses nor lower than the lowest."
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CONCLUSION
Respondent suggests that this court does not have juris.
diction to entertain this appeal and submits that Ogden City
does have the lawful right and authority to take property
through eminent domain proceedings to establish an off street
parking lot.
The respondent further submits that in establishing the
value of the property taken the expert witnesses for the de·
fendant in their income analysis used incorrect facts and
future speculative projections of income which have proven
unreliable, that the comparable sales used by the plaintiff's
expert witnesses, were more proximately located on the
Stephens' property than those used by the defendants and
gave the jury a more accurate basis on which to determine
value, that no evidence was available or presented as to any
recent increase in values of property in the area, that the jury
was properly instructed regarding any remoteness in time of
the appraisal, and the jury properly made a determination of
value not below the lowest appraisal nor in excess of the
highest.
)

Respectfully submitted,
Carl T. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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